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A knowledge of the House of Representatives is important to members of
the armed services, and particularly to those who receive specialized train-
ing in coraptrollership, both as a matter of citizenship and because the
Congress exercises legal control over administrative and budgetary processes
of the executive branch through substantive legislation and enactment of ap-
propriation bills. An understanding of Congress is necessary to an appreci-
ation of its actions. These actions result from interplay of politics, sec-
tionalism, seniority, and similar factors. The centers of power in Congress
exercise a tight control over legislation. The size and composition of the
armed forces depends then upon Congress and those who propound the case of the
armed forces before that body can better present that case if aware of the
many factors which influence the individual congressman. It is obvious that
mutual understanding will benefit the common endeavor of national defense.
This paper will be generally limited to a study of the House of Repre-
sentatives since that body takes initial and most comprehensive action on
the President's budget. This is no reflection on the prestige of the United
States Senate, considered by many to be the most powerful legislative body
in the world. Emphasis will be placed on conditions as they exist in the 84th
Congress.
"The Congress of the United States is the world's best hope of repre-











not only our own nation but also the whole free world." Congress is faced
with one major enemy, world coamunism, and two fundamental internal problems
—
curbing and integrating self-centered special interests and holding responsible
the ever-growing bureaucracy which threatens to throw our representative sys-
tem of government off balance.
Since the Senate is now elected by direct popular vote, the concept of
the House's being the "popular" body rests on the grounds that since the entire
embership is forced to seek re-election every two years, the House is more
responsive to the people; also, at least in the larger states, representation
is in proportion to the population, "Congressmen necessarily and properly
reflect the attitudes and needs of their individual districts, and many, if
not most, of these are economic." "Representative government is based on the
idea that voters will choose certain individuals who will act for them in
certain matters, or for a fixed period on all matters of policy." In other
words, under our representative system, the national will is the sum of the
individual wills expressed in their choices of Senators and Representatives
tin the several states and congressional districts. The President is envi-
sioned as the only nationally elected representative of the individual voters.
This is true to the extent that he speaks for the nation, but in most instances
his election is secured by a combination of sectional, economic, minority and
Ernest S. Griffith, Congress—Its Contemporary Role » (New York: New
York University Press, 1951), p. 1,
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3other political interests—a majority of the same voters, as represented in
the Electoral College, that elect the individual members of Congress.
Unfortunately, many of the voters who participate in presidential
elections often ignore the selection of their congressman in both primary and
final elections. Voting in the off-year elections is always less than in the
presidential years, particularly when no Senate seat is in contest. This can
be explained in part by lack of publicity as well as lack of interest. Some
states encourage a larger off-year vote by means of holding elections for high
state officials in the non-presidential years. Based on public opinion polls
which have indicated that more than half of the persons interviewed did not
know the name of their congressman, the length of his term, or even that there
would be an election in 1946, Millspaugh states that: "The House of Repre-
sentatives suffers most from popular ignorance or indifference."
The history of this nation reveals a constant shift in the balance of
power between the executive and congressional branches of the government. This
has been due to the election of "strong" or "weak" presidents, divided politi-
cal control of the two branches (dnd of the two houses of Congress), and the
spirit of the times. In periods of war or depression, the chief executive has
usually exerted his powers to a considerable extent— in other eras, Congress
has often been supreme. In discussing this instability which affects the pre-
dictability, continuity, and certainty of governmental action, Millspaufh
considers first:
5
And not necessarily a majority of the voters, e.g., J. v. Adams,
Lincoln, Hayes, B. Harrison, Wilson, Truman. The World Almanac and Book of
Facts. 1956 (New York: The New York World-Telegram, 1956), p. 580.
Arthur C. Millspaugh, Toward Efficient Government
. (Washington, D. C.
:
The Brookings Institute, 1949), p. 178. This ignorance is a sad commentary
on the efficacy of our public schools.
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4The familiar and often uncalculated shift from congressional to
presidential government and back again. . . . Changeability in the
presidency is matched by changeability in Congress, for the charac-
ter of Congress is determined basically by the play of ecosoomic
interest, party allegiance, and personalities in four or five hun-
dred territorial subdivisions.'
The members of this generation are accustomed to the "strong" presi-
dency« Only four of the past thirteen presidential terms (since 1901) were
occupied by less than potent party leaders. On the other hsnd, Wilson, in
1885, having known only Lincoln to emerge from the long line of political pawns
that followed Jackson after 1837, considered Congress to be supreme:
I am disposed to think, however, that the decline in the character
of the Presidents is not the cause, but only the accompanying manifes-
tation of the declining prestige of the presidential office. That
high office has fallen from its first estate of dignity because its
power has waned; and its power has waned because the power of Congress
has become predominant.
°
The evils of a breakdown in the traditional balance of powers are best
illustrated by a consideration of the Reconstruction era when Congress, domin-
ated by the House of Representatives, ruled almost supreme. A single party
representing a single part of the nation achieved the closest thing to dictator
ship that we have known. The result was control of elections by the use of
federal troops, impeachment of President Johnson (with failure to convict by
but one vote) on purely political grounds, addition to Supreme Court membership
to insure desired decisions, repeated passage of legislation of doubtful consti
tutionality over presidential veto, and finally, "theft" of the Election of
1672. Fortunately, the political compromise which allowed the inauguration





Woodrow Wilson, Congressional (Government
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and Co., 1898), p. 43.
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the "rebellious" states and the end of the single party dictatorship.
Obviously, the very life of the representative system as we know it
depends upon an equilibrium among the major parties, the geographical sections,
and the branches of the government. Proposed "reforms" which would upset this
balance of power or prevent the continuance of a strong minority party (e.g.,
proportional representation) should be viewed with the suspicion that the cure
ay well be more nearly fatal than the disease.
o
Claude G. Bowers, The Tragic Era
.






Legislative experience prior to the establishnent of government under
the Constitution in 1789 consisted of the colonial legislatures, the Continental
Congress, and the Congress under the Articles of Confederation. Many of the
founders of the Constitution had served in these bodies and brought that exper-
ience to the Convention of 1787. In addition, they were, for the most part,
avid students of the political writings of the times and familiar with other
governmental systems, particularly the British Parliament. Through bitter
experience they had learned a mistrust of strong executive power and the early
legislative bodies reflected that feeling. The need for some sort of a central
government to resist the British was recognized by the revolutionary states,
but to that central authority was granted as little power as possible.
The first Continental Congress was a revolutionary body, pure
and simple, deriving its right to exist from the sanction of common
consent and force. From the earliest meeting in 1774 ttntil nearly
the surrender of Cornwallis in 1781, it remained a voluntary body,
without formal authorization or a deliberate constitution. The
States wanted independence, but were jealous of their complete
freedom of action.^
Ratification of the Articles of Confederation provided a formal govern-
ment in which the limited executive powers granted by the States were retained
in the Congress. Government under the Articles of Confederation was success-
ful to the extent that it provided the ninimum organization sufficient to carry
Frederic L. Paxson, History of the American Frontier 1763-18Q3
.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924), p. 47.
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7the war to a satisfactory conclusion and to establish peace and order. '*The
Articles of Confederation were weak and inadequate at best. They provided
only a meeting place for debate and recosunendation, without power to enforce a
decision or to protect the majority will, ... No important acts could be
2
taken without a two-thirds vote of the States." The inherent weakness was
dual sovereignty and the prospects of the thirteen states acting in unison
toward their coomion good, particularly in the important fields of finance,
taxation, defense, and foreign relations, appeared dubious. None of the states
was strong enough to stand alone, but none was willing to surrender its powers
to a central government. Internal trade barriers began to develop; economic
radicalism with demands for cheap money alarmed conservative leaders (Washing-
ton, Morris, Hamilton); and, decline in foreign trade, inability to enforce
treaty rights, depreciation of the currency, and failure to meet debt payments
demonstrated to thinking aien of all sections that a stronger central union was
essential to survival.
Little but debate was accomplished in the Congress. States failed to
pay their tax requisitions and attendance of members was increasingly delin-
quent. To quote James Truslow Adams: "The one great act of statesmanship
. • . had been the Northwest Ordinance, passed in 1787, for the purpose of
providing for the governing of this vast tract, which formed a possible colonial
empire as large as the Union itself.**'
Even Jeffersoa, author of the Declaration of Independence, and long a
2lbid., p. 48.
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William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner, American Government
.
(New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1953), pp. 72-75.
4
James Truslow Adams, The Epic of America
.
(New York: Blue Ribbon
Books, 1931), p. 105.
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8foe of federalism, influenced by his experiences as Minister to France, realized
that the Articles were not adequate for a solid and enduring union. He was
convinced that:
Until teeth were put into the compact, particularly in the raising
of money and in foreign relations, America would never command the re-
spect of the rest of the world or be able to enforce its own proper
demands. He had even gone so far on occasion to express a wish that
Congress be empowered to use force against recalcitrant states.^
During the period 1765-86, public sentiment became more conservative.
The radical leaders of the Revolution gradually lost power. People began to
desire to settle down to work and to trade. They were content with political
revolution and exhibited little desire for radical social and economic changes.
Conservative, property-holding classes, who came into political control
of BK>st of the states, began to think in national terms. The prospects of
three or four small, divided groups of ex-colonies and possibilities of British
Intervention under such circumstances were strong influences toward the de-
velopment of a federalist approach to the union.
Resolutions were pushed through state legislatures which resulted in a
call for a convention at Annapolis in 1786 to amend the Articles of Confeder-
ation. Since only five states sent delegates, this convention adjourned, but,
first, proposed further action by the states to establish a strong central
government. Congress supported this call, which resulted in the famous Con-
vention of 1787.6
Despite its failures, the Confederation government made substantial
contributions to the Constitution. '*rhe Constitutional Convention was to adopt
5
Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson
.
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1951), I. 340.
6
Anderson and Weidner, op. cit







9sweeping reforms of a profoundly important character, but nevertheless, it
built upon the constitutional foundations erected in the Confederation era.**
Walker has placed a different emphasis on these foundations in stating that:
**Ottr present national Constitution, which went into effect in 1789, was based
almost in its entirety on pre-existing state constitutions and current political
theory."^
7
Alfred H, Kelly, and Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution,
(New York: W. Norton & Company, 1948), I, 113.
8





The United States Constitution, as finally signed by thirty-nine dele-
gates September 17, 1787, was the result of a long series of c<M[aproiBises in
convention between proponents of varied interests. Representation at the
convention was conprised of members of the propertied classes who agreed,
generally, as to the need for an effective central government, but differed as
to the means to this end« Of the seventy-four delegates appointed by twelve
states, but fifty-'five ever attended the convention. Nine of the seventy-four
refused to accept the appointment. Rhode Island was at no time represented
and did not enter the Union until May 29, 1790, a year after the government
was organized. Average attendance of delegates at the convention was probably
no greater than thirty to thirty-five. Of the capabilities of the individual
delegates, only the highest of praise has been reported. For example:
These men constituted as distinguished and brilliant a body of
statesmen as America could have brought together, nearly all of
America's great men of the day being present. Most of the delegates
had long experience in public office, and many were to rise to fur-
ther eminence in the service of the government they were creating.
While most were lawyers and statesmen, the mercantile and landed
classes were also well represented.'^
Absent on foreign missions were Jefferson and John Adams. Not in
attendance were those who opposed a strong central government, including such
leaders of the Revolution as Sam Adams and Henry. These opponents led the
Kelly and Harbison, op. cit .. I, 120-21.
10

ufight against ratification which nearly succeeded. The adoption of the Bill
of Rights, i.e., the first ten araendments, was the price paid by the conserva-
tives for enough votes to secure ratification by the nine states necessary to
place the new Constitution into effect.
Convention sessions were held in Philadelphia. Washington was unani-
mously chosen to preside. Each state, as in the old Congress, was allowed one
vote. **In order to permit the members to speak freely and plainly and to pro-
2
tect them against criticism and pressure," it was decided to hold sessions
behind closed doors. Nothing was released for print and the injunction of
secrecy was honored. The principal source of knowledge of the convention's
discussions has been the extensive notes kept by James Madison.
On the issue of the establishment of a legislature, a major cleavage
arose between the large and small states. Since New York was included among
the small states and South Carolina usually voted with the large states, con-
siderations of present size will not reveal the make-up of the convention
factions—it might be further noted that it is fortunate for the contemporary
influence of both New York and South Carolina that the issue was finally
compromised. The large states wanted membership in both chambers to be appor-
tioned according to population; the small state bloc desired retention of the
principle of equality of states in the legislature. **Finally, the Connecticut
delegates, who wanted a strong government, but who were determined to secure
SMue recognition of the states, came forward with very able arguments in support
• *
.** of that plan which was finally adopted. This provided for equality of
2
Frederic A. Ogg and P. Orman Ray, Essentials of American Government
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voting by states in the upper house, but apportionment by population in the
lower house. Provisions that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived
of equal suffrage in the Senate and that each state shdl have at least one
representative in the House have made this compromise almost irrevocable.
Actually there has been little conflict between small-state interests in the
Senate and large-state interests in the House. "As Madison predicted in the
Convention, the great controversies of American history have been drawn along
sectional rather than interstate lines.**
Election of Senators by state legislatures was provided under the theory
that these Senators were, in effect, ministers plenipotentiary from the states
to the federal government. In the case of representatives, members were en-
visioned to be delegates from the people rather than from the states—hence
reference to the "popular chamber." It was provided, however, that Repre-
sentatives must be residents of the state from which elected.
It was also felt that the members of the popular chamber should
be able to keep in close touch with their constituents. Local com-
munities had reality at that time. The people were scattered; trans-
portation and communication slow. It was intended that the House of
Representatives should be a comparatively numerous body. It seemed
logical, therefore, that its members should be apportioned according
to population, distributed among localities, and elected locally.
It was believed that when the representatives came together in Con-
gress, each would speak with special knowledge of the interests and
views of his constituents. Thus, the House as a whole would be in-
formed, extensively and intensively, and would be truly popular,^
At this time, suffrage was restricted by various property qualifications
No attempt was made by the convention to broaden the electoral base. Determi-
nation as to who should vote was left to the states that ".
. .
the electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
4
Kelly and Harbison, op. cit .. i, 130.
5




/-» ( .*>:, c4
13
numerous branch of the State Legislature," Other germane constitutional pro-
visions include: The House shall choose its own Speaker and other officers;
the legislature of each state shall prescribe the times, places and manner of
holding elections for Representatives; Congress may at any time make laws
altering these election regulations; the House shall be the judge of the elec-
tions, returns, and qualifications of its members; and that the House shall
7ake its own procedural rules. These provisions are important because they
give to the House much of the power needed to correct alleged abuses which are
noted in the following chapters. Through the years, by amendment. Judicial
interpretation, and administrative law and custom, the actual operation of the
constitutional system is considerably different from what the founders envis-
ioned. Change, however, they anticipated since provision was made for amending
the basic provisions. The original concept of the House of Representatives
has altered but little during the 167 years which have transpired since the
meeting of the First Congress.
U. S. Constitution, Art. I, Sect 2, Par. 1.
7











During the period following the Revolution, there was a continuous rgove-
ent to broaden the suffrage. This was resisted by the propertied groups which
held the political power, but in state after state the restrictions were low-
ered. In Pennsylvania, all qualifications for office holding or voting, except
payment of a state tax, were eliminated. Similar action was taken in North
Carolina. "The revolution brought a distinct increase in the electorate, al-
though the qualifications for voting differed. The poorer elements both in
the town and in the frontier sections increased their influence." "By 1825
every Northern State had finally provided for manhood suffrage." This broad-
ening of the electorate followed the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian theories that
economic and political democracy would advance together and that opportunity
would be assured by manhood suffrage.
A similar movement occurred in England where the right to choose repre-
sentatives gradually extended to enfranchise the unpropertied classes. Con-
cessions often followed organization of the disenfranchised classes and either
armed revolt or threat thereof, e.g., the Reform Bill of 1832. Resistance of
the propertied classes extended this period over a hundred years despite a
3general feeling in the desirability of universal manhood suffrage.
Adams, The Epic of America
, p. 104. ^Ibid,
,
p. 171.
German Finer, Theory and Practice of Modern Government
.
(New York:
Henry Holt &Co., 1949), p. 228.
14
i(f^ 10
V .i ^ u i
15
"Another part of the Jacksoaian effort sought to guarantee the political
rights of labor. Having gained the ballot, the working man faced the problem
of making sure he voted as he pleased.** This included efforts toward ballot
reform and the elimination of the poll tax.
Due to the constitutional provision which allowed voters for the lower
state house to vote for members of the national House, these reforms also in-
creased the electorate for that body. The voters became party conscious and
began to expect greater consideration from their elected representatives. In
explaining the failure of the later Adams generations to seek elective office,
Truslow Adams wrote:
As we look aver the list of the early leaders of the republic,
Washington, John Adams, Hamilton, and others, we discern that they
were all men who insisted upon being themselves and who refused to
truckle to the people. With each succeeding generation, the grow-
ing demand of the people that its elective officials shall not lead
but merely register the popular will has steadily undermined the _
independence of those who derive their power from popular election.
The addition of about two and a half million foreigners, chiefly in the
Middle Atlantic and New England states between 1830 and 1850 gave an entirely
new complexion to the problems of self-government and manhood suffrage. The
iiBBigrants were largely underpaid and uneducated and had little experience with
participation in government. These new citizens could be easily led by "bosses'
and the big city machines began to function in earnest. The wealthy cared
little about politics as long as the legislatures gave them the desired results.
"People were no longer thinking in terms of statesmanship and the future, but
4
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson
.
(Boston: Little Brown
and Company, 1946), p. 343.
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of private business and the present."
With this same control of many seats in the House by district bosses who
controlled noainations in the conventions and caucuses and elections through
single party domination of many districts. Since these same bosses exercised
control over the legislatures, unruly Congressmen, who could not be defeated
at the polls, faced the danger of having their districts reorganized to their
disadvantage. With the reduction in quality of members came a reduction in
oral standards. There were too few like John Quincy Adams ivho:
. .
. called upon Nicholas Biddle at the United States Bank and
handed him a certificate of stock with the request that it be sold
immediately, because, although the investment was a profitable one
and Adams believed in the Bank, he felt that possibly he would be
called upon to vote on some measure connected with it and therefore
ought to have no personal interest in it. '^
Alexander describes the House as "an aggregation of vigorous elements,
having different objects, antagonistic notions, and selfish interests, centered
about indefinite party policies and moved by personal, political, and sometimes
patriotic purposes." Wilson, describing the capability of members (in 18C5)
tacitly places responsibility upon the electorate:
But the Senate is in fact, of course, nothing more than a part,
though a considerable part, of the public service, and if the general
conditions of that service be such as to starre statesisen and foster
demagogues, the Senate itself will be full of the latter kind, simply
because there are no others available. There cannot be a separaate
breed of public men reared specially for the Senate, It must be re-
cruited from the lower branches of the representative system, of
which it is only the topmost part. No stream can be purer than its
sources. The Senate can have in it not better men than the best men
of the House of Representatives; and if the House of Representatives
attracts to itself only inferior talent, the Senate must put up with
6
Adams, The Epic of America , p. 183.
7
Adams, The Adams Family , p. 214.
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OeAlva S. Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of Repre -
sentatives
. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), p. 27.
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the same sort. I think it safe to say, therefore, that, though it
nay not be as good as could be wished, the Senate is as good as it
can be under the circumstances. It contains the most perfect pro-
duct of our politics, whatever that product may be.^
Millspaugh, who, among other things, recoomends abolishment of the House
of Representatives, considers the membership as follows:
In the House of Representatives, few members possess qualifi-
cations for national leadership; many can be local leaders, within
the restrictions of localism; but at Washington, being parts of a
multitude, they lack position, prestige, and power. Those who rise
above the crowd—the Speaker and the chairmen of committees—seldom
meet the demands of national leadership. ^^
In an attempt to limit the abuses which were attiibuted to caucuses and
conventions, various states adopted legislation providing for the direct pri-
mary which allowed the voters to select their party's nominee for office. Such
leaders as LaFollette, Bryan, and Theodore Roosevelt championed this principle
which has been extended to almost all of the states. Individual states have
widely different laws, but the effect has been the same—reduction of power of
the political ^oss** and less party responsibility for legislation. Whether or
not better candidates are actually nominated under the primary is still, after
fifty years experience, open to debate.
Actually, once having achieved election, the chances of re-election of
congressmen are very good. The American voter, under ordinary circumstances,
has a proclivity for casting his ballot for a familiar name to the great advan-
tage of the incumbent. In districts where the political balance is close, the
fortunes of the candidates are closely tied to the presidential nominees, but
there are frequent examples of vote splitting. Johnson says:
Q
Wilson, op. cit .. p. 195.





There is a turnover of individual Congressmen from one term of
Congress to another ranging from one fifty to one fourth, but the
type of personnel
^ . .
probably does not change much from one Con-
gress to another. ^
Turnover in recent Houses (for all causes) has been less. Newly elected
in November 1950 for service in the 82nd Congress were seventy-one members, of
which fourteen had previous House service. ^^ In the election of November 1954,
there were fifty new members elected, plus six members returned to the 84th
Congress who had not served in the 83rd Congress.* Thus, the turnover was
less than thirteen percent in an election year in which the majority control
of the House change between parties.
In the final analysis, the membership of the House reflects the wishes
of the majority of the individual voters in the several districts. Adams takes
a pessimistic view of the problem:
The comparatively simple social and governmental problems of
1787 had become so overwhelmingly complex that it is a question
today whether we or any other nation are going to be able to solve
them by intelligence or whether we shall become the victims of un-
controlled forces. In the early days men received a political edu-
cation in the town meetings, and most of their problems were close
to their homes. By 1900 the organization of the political system
had become such that it seemed to run with as little chance for the
individual to influence it as the dynamo in a central power plant. ^^
More hopeful is the knowledge that most of the members are well-educated
men—far more so than most of their constituents—although there is reason to
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the membership will follow improvement in the electorate; a job for the public
schools in which we invested over seven billion dollars in 1952 alone.
Reformers would do well to look to their own school districts and to strike
at the source of the difficulty, not at its manifestations.






Apportionment is the process by which seats in the House of Representa-
tives are allocated to the several states. Constitutional requirements are
that every state shall have at least one seat and that disbribution of addi-
tional seats shall be based on the respective numbers within the states.
Enumeration by a decennial census is provided. Congress has failed but once
(1920) to reapportion seats among the states after the census was completed.
Congress may provide for any number of seats with the reservation that the
total shall not exceed one representative per thirty thousand inhabitants. The
present total of 435 represents about one per 345,000 people.
The importance of apportionment is twofold: (1) equitable representa-
tion in the House of Representatives, and (2) the effect on the election of a
President since the electoral vote of each state is the apportioned number of
representatives plus two. Valid apportionment methods can be used with any
size of the House and results will be consistent with the principle upon which
the method is based. ^ To prevent recurrence of the failure in 1920 to reappor-
tion, "the Reapportionment Act of 1929 set the 'permanent* number of House
members at 435 and provided for automatic reapportionment in case Congress
Laurence F. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment
.
(Washington, D.C.
The Brookings Institution, 1941), p. v, 2.
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fails to act.' The President submits to Congress in the first session after
coapletion of the census, a proposed apportionment based on figures developed
by the Bureau of the Census. The apportionment takes effect unless contrary
3
action is taken by Congress within sixty days. This method reduces political
consideration in apportionment to the minimum—a vital factor since the shift
of a few seats between one-party states could easily decide the election of a
president or control of the House in close elections. Schmeckebier analyses
automatic apportionment as follows:
The automatic apportionment is desirable because the method is
specified in advance, and no one knows whether any state or group
of states will be favored. It avoids logrolling and controversy,
and prevents a stalemate such as occurred after the census of 1920.
Methods of apportionment should be both equitable and mathematically
sound. Methods in use in the Nineteenth Century met neither standard, Jeffer-
son's rejected fraction method, used between 1790 and 1830, divided a ratio of
seats to population into the state population and awarded seats on the basis of
whole number results, all fractions being dropped. There were frequent charges
that this method, in addition to being unsound in a mathematical sense, favored
the South and West at the expense of the Northeastern states. This charge is
supported by the fact that when the use of this method would have favored the
5
latter, the method was changed.
The Vinton method, 1650-1900, employed a fixed ratio and used highest
fractions to fill the remainder of the quota. This method created both the
2
*"John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry, The American System of Government
.
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 255.
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Alabama and population paradoxes. In the Alabama paradox, a state receives a
smaller delegation with an increase in the size of the house, all populations
remaining constant. This was first noted in 1880 when Alabama would have lost
a seat with an increase of House membership from 299 to 300. In the population
paradox, with a fixed ratio of representation, an increase is population may
result in an actual decrease in the size of the House. '*No method has been
devised which uses a fixed ratio and avoids paradoxes.**'
"There are five modern systems of apportionment^ which are mathematically
correct, which are easily applied through the use of a priority list, and which
avoid paradoxes.***^ Each starts with a different premise and results may vary
considerably. Two of these methods are recognized by statute, major fractions
and equal proportions. The former provides the smallest absolute difference
between each state in the individual share of a representative; the latter,
by use of the geometric mean, provides the smallest relative difference. The
method of equal proportions has been in use since 1941.
'^Mathematicians generally agree that the significant feature of a dif-
ference is its relation to the smaller number and not its absolute quantity."
The method of equal proportions is the only one which uses relative differences
and provides:
The smallest relative difference for both average population per
district and individual share in a representative. No other method
takes account of both these factors. Therefore the method of equal
proportions gives the most equitable distribution of representatives
among the states. ^^
^
Ibid.
. pp. 5-11; 73-81.
^Ibid
.. p. 73.
®Ibid., p. 12. "^Ibid., p. 60.
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Whatever the method used, the result has generally followed the popd-
lation trend. Gains in seats have been largely in the rapid-growing Pacific
and Mountain states at the expense of the rest of the country. The former have
gained twenty-four seats since 1912 of which nineteen are in California. Heav-
iest losses have been in the North Central states which lost nineteen seats,
partially offset by a gain of five in Michigan. Ottier important exceptions to
the general trend are Texas and Florida each of which gained four seats during
the period being considered. The result has been, of course, a shift in
sectional influence. In the present Congress, the Speaker and Senate majority
leader are both Texans. The Vice President and Senate minority leader are
from California. Three of the last four presidents have come from states west
0f the Mississippi River.
Establishment of Districts
After Congress has apportioned the representatives among the states, it
is the responsibility of the legislatures thereof to determine the boundaries
of congressional districts from which representatives are elected. Congress
has provided little guidance in this matter, although fully empowered to do so
by the Constitution, and such legislation as Congress has enacted has not been
enforced or has been so full of loopholes as to be without practical effect.
For about half a century, there was no rule as to how representatives
should be chosen within the states. Some legislatures established districts,
others used the general ticket plan—each voter cast a single ballot for all
the representatives to which the state was entitled. "The general ticket system
contains a grave injustice, in that the party with a plurality of votes, how-
11 - ,
cf. Anderson and Weidner, op. cit.. p. 507 Fiaure 28 ~ rhannp-c in





ever slight, will win all the representatives in the state." Since this was
the same way that presidential electors are chosen, there is doubt that Congress
was alarmed about the "injustice" of the general ticket plan, but a disputed
election affected the entire New Jersey ticket and upon the settlement thereof
depended the control of the House. This proved that the general ticket plan
had political limitations and Congress, in 1843, passed a law setting up the
single member district plan. This has been diluted by modifications so that
additional members gained by apportionment may be elected "at large" and so
that failure to redistrict after loss of a seat results in all members being
elected "at large." They are, however, elected as individuals rather than on
a general ticket plan. This device has been used in both New Mexico and North
Dakota to avoid creation of districts so that both members from each state are
elected "at large."
"The requirement from 1901 to 1929 was for single-member districts of
13
C0Bq)act and contiguous territory, as nearly equal in population as possible."
This legislation was never enforced and has been determined in the courts to be
BO longer in effect since it was not re-enacted in the 1930 apportionment bill.
Due to lack of standards imposed either by federal or state legislation,
"there is a wide variation in the extent to which the traditional standards of
14
equal population and of contiguous and compact territory are followed."
There appears to be no legal method by which a state may be forced to reap-
portion its districts, no matter how far they vary from any equitable standard.
12
Johnson, op. cit .. p. 353.
13^
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If appropriate statutes were enacted, individual citizens could, perhaps,
compel action through the courts. Since the courts would have to permit the
exercise of a considerable amount of legislative judgment, it is doubted if
this remedy would be very successful except in the most obvious cases.
As will be demonstrated later, there are still many states in which
there is room for a great deal of improvement in the matter of districting.
Although there is evidence of gerrymandering and disproportionate representation
of rural areas, the principal evil is the failures of states to do anything.
•*Since Congress has no authority to compel state legislatures to act except by
denying seats to representatives from states which refuse to redistrict, dis-
15
tricting plans, long outgrown, continue in effect."
Schmeckebier's proposed solution: "The most satisiactory remedy in
case of lack of action or compliance within the state seems to be to have the
districting done by Congress. To the writer, this cure seems worse than the
evil. To make the creation of districts a national political football could
have serious effects. Since the House as a whole can have little knowledge of
the situation in any given state, it is likely the incumbent members would be
able to create their own districts and a majority faction could avenge itself
•B any unpopular member. This would give Congress undue power to perpetuate
itself.
Again, the best solution seems to lie in improvement of the electorate.
Congress should enact legislation to establish standards for districting and
rely upon the voters in the individual state to demand corrective action as
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who would lead the protest. One means Congress has to force some action in the
states is to refuse to seat members elected "at large" from states entitled
to more than one representative. It is doubted that Congress has either the
knowledge or political objectivity necessary to create desirable districts
within the many states in an effective manner—its time could certainly be used
to better advantage.
State Action
One excellent reason for the states* failure to establish equitable con-
gressional districts is the fact that their own legislatures are seldom truly
representative. "The members from the rural districts have always constituted
17
a majority in the state legislatures." This, in early days when society was
predominately agricultural, was right and proper. Now, despite a relative de-
crease in those who classify themselves as farmers, the control is no less
complete. For example, in Connecticut, Union, population 234, and Hartford,
le
population 166,326, have equal representation in the state legislature. One
must agree with Holloway who says that "rotten boroughs" exist in several states
and that it is general that large cities are under-represented if for no other
reason than that the legislators from rural areas are reluctant to reapportion
their own seats out of existence for the benefit of the cities.
Walker cites a study made in 1937 which disclosed that "in only five
states
. . .
was urban representation in both houses of the state legislature
17
Graves, op.cit
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legislation. The Committee, through special orders, may give precedence to
particular measures, limit debate on them, and specify the number and nature of
amendments. The Committee exercises power by inaction as well. Many measures
are killed or delayed until compromise is reached by failure of the Committee
to act. "Congress always makes what haste it can to legislate. It is the
prime object of its rules to expedite lawmaking."'
The Speaker
The Speaker of the House of Representatives is one of the most powerful
political leaders in the United States. He is, after the Vice president, next
in succession to the president. Even before the revolt of 1911, however, his
powers were exercised through other leaders. To quote Wilson, writing in 1885:
He (the Speaker) is a great party chief, but the hedging circum-
stances of his official position as presiding officer prevent his
performing the part of active leadership. He agpoints the leaders
of the House, uat he is not himself the leader.^
"What the Speaker meant to those who drew up our instrument of govern-
ment cannot be gathered from the records of the Convention, for there appears
to have been no debate on the matter."*' From the prior political experience
of the members in colonial assemblies and Congress, it must be inferred that
they expected the Speaker to be a political leader rather than the non-politica!
moderator who acts as Speaker of the House of Commons.
Though since the First Congress the Speaker has been a powerful politica:
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secondary importance—at least little more than their names survived the history
of the period. The first famous Speaker was Henry Clay, Speaker in six Con-
gresses before election to the Senate, Secretary of State, and three times
unsuccessful candidate for President. The new principles of speakership power
set forth during Clay's tenure in office were, "First, the increase of the
Speaker's parliamentary power; secondly, the strengthening of his personal in-
fluence; and thirdly, the establishment of his position as a legislative
leader." That Clay, with Calhoun and the other "War Hawks." used this power
largely to force war with England which was neither necessary nor successful
(and, considering the state of the armed forces of the United States in 1812,
night better be termed foolhardy) over the better Judgment of President Madison
and the violent objections of the Northeastern States, only confirms the great
power in the hands of a vigorous Speaker when supported by an energetic ma-
lljority of the House,
The powers of the Speaker gradually increased by virtue of the increased
size of the House, which required more effective discipline, and due to the
stratification of political parties.
In the post-Civil War era, the office had reached a new pinnacle
of authority and prestige. This was in part because of the increased
power of Congress, which had engaged and defeated President Johnson
in the conflict over Reconstruction. Also, a long series of undis-
tinguished Presidents, extending from Grant through McKinley, had
strengthened congressional ascendancy over the executive. ^^
Forceful and capable leaders (Blaine, Reed, Randall, Cannon) in the same period
ultimately created almost absolute power in the Speaker based on his right in
^^Ibid., p. 71.
Francis F. Beirne, The War of 1812
.
(New York: E. P. Dutton C Co.,
1949), pp. 64-95.
12
Kelly and Harbison, op. cit .. II, 616.
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"(1) appointment of committees, (2) his chairmanship, ex officio of the Com-
13
mittee on Rules, and (3) the 'recognition' of a member to address the House."
The Speaker was generally considered next to the President in power.
The Speaker was the party leader, but when the majority party found
itself with no recognized leader, a struggle for position began. Factors of
previous service, political motives, sectional claims, private interests, and
personal characteristics of the candidates influenced the choice of the party
caucus.
The ultimate in dictatorship by the Speaker was reached by Cannon**^ and
resulted in the revolt of 1911 against his authority:
The rise of the Progressive bloc in Congress opened up the possi-
bility of an effective Progressive-Democratic attack on the Speaker's
powers. The Progressives looked upon the office as it was then em-
ployed as an affront to their ideal of democratic self-government and
as a reactionary bulwark against the passage of liberal social legis-
lation. They were eager to cooperate with the Democrats in an effort
to reduce Cannon's authority. Representative George W. Norris of
Nebraska was the astute director of the campaign toward this end.^°
Victories of the rebels included the inauguration of "Calendar Wednesday
in 1909. This set aside one day a week in which the Speaker was obliged to
take up the business of the House in order without regard to priorities fixed
by the Rules Committee and prevented bills of individual members from burial.
In 1910, the power of the Speaker to appoint the Rules Committee was abolished.
13
Finer, op. cit .. p. 478.
14
Follett, op. cit .. pp. 33-40.
15
cf. Roger Butterfield, The American Past
.
(New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1947), p. 337. Butterfield describes Speaker Joseph Gurney Cannon of
Illinois as a "hard-boiled hayseed who had made himself autocrat of the House.
Cannon first entered Congress in 1873 and won the nickname of 'Foul-mouthed Joe
by his barnyard talk."
Kelly and Harbison, op. cit .. II, 617-18.
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instead membership was elected by the House. When the Democrats secured con-
trol of the House in 1911, the Speaker was no longer allowed to appoint members
of other committees.
In defense of the Speakership, Alexander wrote:
It is doubtful if Speakers have, as a rule, been unduly partial
In their appointments. Custom based on unwritten law has obliged
them to recognize long service, peculiar fitness, party standing,
and a fair division among States and important groups of men,^'
Nevertheless, almost from the beginning there were constant complaints of parti-
ality, of which there were abundant examples, and personal motives. That it
was customary to appoint members to committees based on their friendliness or
hostility to certain proposed legislation was understood and generally accepted.
Under a system of party and political leadership, it is difficult to see how
the Speaker could have done otherwise. More difficult to defend was the policy,
particularly after the Civil War when public morals were at an unusually low
state, of consulting important men of industry before the Speaker released his
appointments. It was often reiterated that both Blaire and Randall had too
Intimate an acquaintance with the "gentlemen of the lobby." Demand for reform
gradually attracted greater support. The result of the "reform" was a diffusion
of responsibility and "after four years of testing out a Committee of Com-
ittees, the opinion of the most prominent members on both sides of the House,
although perhaps not publically expressed, is, that it is a failure." What-
ever the abuse of power which may be charged to individual Speakers, to quote
Reed, "What he does, he does it in the open." Loss of appointment power by
the Speaker has been replaced by the automatic operation of the seniority sys-











Another power of the Speaker, which has largely remained, is the poter
of recognition, or failure to recognize. This power is based on the implica-
tion in the Rule of 1789 that when two or more members happen to rise at once,
the chair should exercise its judgment. It became the custom to recognize
coBffiiittee chairmen over the individual members and by 1843, Speaker White had
declared this to be the invariable practice. It became common practice for
the Speaker to fail to recognize outstanding advocates of undesired legislation
or opponents of the party line. Later Speakers, notably Blaine, Carlisle, and
Cannon increased the use of this precedent for political and personal reasons.
During the Reed period it became customary to inquire, "For what purpose does
the gentleman rise?" For almost a century a member was considered to have the
right of appeal to the House on matters of non-recognition by the Speaker. In
1881, Speaker Randall refused to adopt the precedent and compared the finality
of his rulings in the matter to that of the Supreme Court in its interpretation
of the law. This, of course, had the effect of preventing the consideration of
much proposed legislation and aroused resentment among many of the members.
On the other hand, it must be appreciated that for the House to transact its
necessary business within the time limits which prevailed, it was impossible to
allow unlimited debate and discussion at length of inessential and dilatory
motions, ^
Despite the curtailment of his powers, the Speaker, by reason of his
personal eminence, without which he would hardly hold the office, is considered
to have the greatest influence over legislation of any individual. He is still
the most important officer in the House and a senior member of the majority








the House, His rulings are seldom questioned—members of his own party do not
desire to vex him and the minority appreciates the futility of forcing a vote
20
in which the Speaker will be sustained by the majority.
The Speakership has become in fact, if not in individual desire, a
terminal office. Of all the Speakers, only one, Polk, became President. Two
others, Clay and Blaine, were major party nominees. The fact is that many
Speakers were mediocre men; others had offended too many people in reaching
office or in holding it; and some, by the time they had achieved seniority
21
necessary for the office, were too old for further consideration.
Standing Committees
A dominant role in policy making in the House is played by the standing
coranittees. With power to report or to bury; amend or rewrite; initiate or
ignore; expedite or delay; and in effect determine what the House will consider,
"the real locus of legislative power is not in the House or Senate; it is in
22
the standing committees." The same situation existed 70 years ago. To
quote Wilson:
I know not how better to describe our form of government in a single
phrase than by calling it a government by the chairmen of the Stand-
ing Committees of Congress. This disintegrate ministry, as it figures
on the floor of the House of Representatives, has many peculiarities.
In the first place, it is made up of the elders of the assembly; for,
by custom, seniority in congressional service determines the bestowal
of the principal chariraanships; in the second place, it is constituted
of selfish and warring elements; for chairman fights against chairman
for use of the time of the assembly, though the most part of them are
inferior to the chairman of Ways and Means, and all are subordinate to
the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. 23
Ibid ., pp. 377-78.
22
Galloway, op. cit .. p. 225.
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In the First Congress, comnittee members were selected by ballot, but,
this having proved unsatisfactory, the Speaker was empowered in 1790 to appoint
nembers unless otherwise specially directed by the House. The original princi-
ple seems to have been that the committees would be impartial board of investi-
24
gation, but they soon became actively partisan. In the era before the Civil
War, there were several instances where members of the minority party (e.g.,
Webster, J. Q. Adams) were appointed to cosmittee chairmanships, but now these
appointments are never given to the minority and are regarded as legitimate
25
prerogatives of the majority.
After the revolt of 1911, the Speaker lost his power of appointment,
but as a senior party leader he still has a strong voice in the matter. Each
party nominates its own members to the standing committees based on numerical
allocations which roughly follow the proportions of party members in the entire
House. Members of a Comnittee on Cormnittees, selected by the Republican caucus,
designate the Republican members. The Democrats operate in a similar manner
through the Ways and Means Coranittee. With certain exceptions, membership is
limited to one standing coiasittee and, once appointed, a member is seldom
dropped from a conmittee except at his own request for a place on a more desir-
26
able committee. From sixty, the House reduced the number of standing com-
mittees to nineteen by 1946, which number has continued through the 84th Con-
gress. With a total membership of 435, it may be seen that opportunities for
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SERVICE OF MAJOR COMMITTEE SENIORS
84th CONGRESS
Democratic Republican
CoBunittee Chairman Yrs. Senior Member Yrs.
Appropriations Cannon (Mo.
)
33 Taber (NY) 33
Ways & Means Cooper (Tenn.
)
27 Reed (NY) 37
Rules Smith (Va.) 25 Allen (111.) 23
Armed Services Vinson (Ga. 41 Short (Mo.
)
23
Agriculture Coo ley vNC) 22 Mope (Kans.) 29
Banking & Currency Spence (Ky. 25 Wolcott (Mich. ) 25
Education & Labor Barden (NC) 21 McConnell (Pa. ) 12
Interstate &
Foreign Commerce Priest (Tenn. 15 Wolverton (NJ) 29
Average Service: 26. 125 26. 375
,.„ .,.,., -. 1
The standing coraaittees, in turn, are largely dominated by their chair-
nen. The chairmen appoint the subcommittees, refer bills to them, determine
the agenda, approve the calling of witnesses and staff appointments, and handle
bills on the floor. They call meetings, schedule hearings, and allocate debate
time during House consideration. Holding office by virtue of seniority (usu-
ally in "safe** districts, it would be difficult otherwise to achieve sufficient
seniority), they exercise tremendous influence over the other coimnittee members
27
—both by promise of favor or withholding of support, **' "in short, committee
chairmen exercise crucial powers over the legislative process. "^^
27
Cf, Wilson, op, cit.. pp. 60-61: ''The leaders of the House are the
chairmen of the principal Standing Committees. Indeed, to be exactly accurate,
the House has as many leaders as there are subjects of legislation; ... It is
this multiplicity of leaders, this many-headed leadership, which makes the
organization of the House too complex to afford uniformed people and unskilled
observers any easy clue to its methods of rule."
28








Since most members belong to but one committee and there is no machinery
established to facilitate or encourage integration of programs, each conmittee
considers its share of the proposed legislation with little, if any, reference
2Q
to other committees.
The need for the standing committees is obvious. The House as a whole
has not the time to consider the thousands of bills that are introduced in the
course of a session. "The work is done for the most part by conraittees, and
the House simply acts upon the committee reports. "^^ Griffith has a similar
conclusion:
Both houses are engaged in a constant and, to a considerable ex-
tent, a losing struggle against the avalanche of business which the
complexities, crises, and political insistences of the present day
have produced. ... a measure of solution [has been found] in the
floor rules and in division of labor among conmittees. . . . The
standing comnittee is the chief instrument with which Congress uses
specialization to confront complexities.^-*^
It would appear that the House lost this struggle against the press of
business a long time ago, before the so-called complexities of the modern world
32
existed. Now the House has gone one step further—delegation to the sub-com-
29
Cf. Wilson, op. cit .. p, 61: "For the chairman of the Standing Com-
mittees do not constitute a cooperative body like a ministry. They do not con>
suit and concur in the adoption of homogeneous and mutually helpful measures;
there is no thought of acting in concert. Each committee goes its own way at itj
own pace. It is impossible to discover any unity or method in the disconnected
and therefore unsystematic, confused, and desultory action of the House, or any
common purpose in the measures which its Committees from time to time recommend.'
30, o|
Johnson, op. cit
.. p. 381. '^^Griffith, op. cit .. p. 16.
32
Cf. Wilson, op. cit
.. p. 79: "The House sits, not for serious dis-
cussion, but to sanction the conclusions of its conraittees as rapidly as possi-
ble. It legislates in its coranittee-rooms; not by the determinations of ma-
jorities, but by the resolutions of specially-comraissioned minorities; so that
it is not far from the truth to say thet Congress in session is Congress on pub-
lic exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work."
Also, Ibid
., p. 82; "It would seem, therefore, that practically Congress, or at
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ittee because the coimnittee is too large to operate efficiently. This is par-
ticularly true in the Appropriations Comnittee. "The only members of the House
who really have a chance to understand a particular program are the half-dozen
subcoBunittee members who sit through the hearings, and their comprehension
33
varies with the nature of the programs they consider."
The real problem of legislation by committee is, therefore, lack of a
coordinated program. The press of business is just too great, both in executive
and legislative agencies, seemingly to control the broad programs in a manner
which will provide efficient and economical government. Effective legislation
requires specialized advice, but that very specialization contributes to the
problem already created by sectionalism and local interests of members. As
will be discussed, it is difficult for either major party even to agree within
its own membership on an integrated national policy much less to make it effec-
tive. We seem to have dozens of little legislatures and executives each going
its own way with coordination, if any, restricted to the vital issues upon
which the safety of the nation depends. The specialized committee of the House
works with or in competition with an equally specialized executive agency.
Each attempts to make policy, often conflicting, and the dominance of local
over national interest has and may be expected to continue to prevent any sort
of an integrated or even very logical program. The best current example of
this inability to coordinate effort is in agriculture where problems of subsi-
dies, disposal of surplus, and creation of additional arable land through irri-
also its deliberate functions to its Standing Committees. The little public
debate that arises under the stringent and urgent rules of the House is fornal
rather than effective, and itis the discussions which take place in the Com-
mittees that give form to legislation.
33
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gation projects defy rational understanding.
Repeated reference has been made to the Congresses of the Nineteenth
Century to demonstrate that this problem of coomnittee government is nothing new,
If there be any good solution under a system of representative government, it
has escaped the notice of the writer.
Seniority
The problem of seniority has been considered in part throughout this
chapter. It exists because seniority substantially disregards all qualifi-
cations except length of continuous service on a given committee. It ha s other
ramifications, from appointment to desirable committees in the first place to
assignment of desirable office space, but the major criticism is in regard to
committee chairmanships. If a member can continue to be re-elected, regardless
of his actual ability, sooner or later he will achieve a chairmanship. '*While
it results in occasional misfits, it ha s brought to the chairmanship of the
greater committees many men of ability and distinction." On the other hand,
**liembers from 'safe' districts acquire precedence often far beyond their
merit. "^^
Actually any attempt to eliminate seniority presents something of a two-
edged sword. Johnson describes the dilemma of opponents of seniority as fol-
lows:
It is obvious that the rule does not necessarily mean that
ability, or industry, or any other desirable quality, except exper-
ience in the House, will be found in a committee chairman. The rule
does, however, have the merit of being easy to administer, and it is
true that the seniors are usually among the best-qualified men for
chairmanships. To abolish the rule would probably precipitate unseemly
34
Ogg and Ray, op. clt







scrambles and intrigues for chairnansbips, which would be worse than
the occasional unfortunate situations to which the present system
gives rise. 36
One great difficulty of the seniority system is that one or more of the
chairmen may be out of sympathy with the program of the party majority. By mer^
delay he can seriously disrupt the legislative process. While there are cer-
tain means to require committees to discharge bills which are "temporarily"
interred in the process of committee consideration, these methods are so cumber-
some and require so much action by a majority of the House that they are seldoa
evoked and are less often successful. "Evidence of committee autonomy is seen
in the difficulty of discharging bills from the committees of Congress and in
the infrequency with which this happens. "3' This problem is common to both
major parties:
The real difficulty that the seniority rule presents is one of
control of legislative policy. In the case of both Republicans and
Democrats, the members of Congress with the most seniority are not
necessarily those who best represent the predominant point of view
of the party. Out of proportion to their numbers, Southeners domi-
nate Democratic chairmanships and the more isolationist or conserva-
tive Republicans dominate theirs. ^^
The latest protests against the seniority rule in Congress were made
by Senators Morse and Lehman over the elevation of Senator Eastland to the
chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee. Objection was based on the claim that
Senator Eastland would not be an impartial agent of the Senate. When the ques-
tion was put to the Senate, March 6, 1956, there was no roll call, but the only
voices heard in opposition were those of Morse and Lehman. "Senator Barkley
said that while he disagreed with Senator Eastland about many things, no one
3^J.h„so„. SE^Mt.. pp. 382-83.
37
Galloway, op. cit
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has yet found a suitable substitute for the seniority rule the Senate has
followed with only three exceptions for 175 years. "'^^
Increased retireaent benefits have induced some of the more senior mem-
bers to indicate recently that they would not seek re-election. This provision
for honorable retirement with pay may rid the House of some of its more senile
or invalid members, but there is no assurance that those that leave will be
those who can best be spared. The legislartion is good, however, and possibly
should be made more liberal. The only way for tne House to assure itself of
a reasonable turnover and a more active participation by the younger members is
to amend the rules so that no member with more than a specified year's service
would be eligible for a chairmanship. Loss of their chairmanships might induce
some of the worst old mossbacks to retire. Whether or not the new chairmen
would be an improvement is open to debate—some of the seniors are extremely
dedicated and capable men. It would prevent one chairman from blocking legis-
lation almost indefinitely.
Political Parties
**Far more than is commonly realized. Congress is at heart bipartisan or
nonpartisan."'*^ Members of the minority party frequently endorse the objec-
tives of a particular bill, but offer amendments shaded toward the immediate
political situation. Rarely is a major alternative offered or is the existence
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Few are the members, regardless of the national party platform, who vote con-
trary to the interests of their districts—silver, labor, agrarian water re-
sources, civil rights, public power, and other blocs transcend party lines.
Other than on purley organizational matters, the vote on few measures is di-
vided on party lines. Motions to recommit are more likely to be divided on a
partisan basis, but on final passage, where a positive commitment must be re-
corded, substantial minority influence usually supports the major party posi-
tion as a replacement for the major party members who vote with the opposition.
There are many controversial measures, but the controversy is seldom purely, or
even substantially, partisan.
There is actually a certain political advantage to being considered
relatively independent in many districts
—
particularly where the parties are
fairly evenly divided. Appeal to the majorities of both parties and avoidance
of the stigma of "bossism** have been worth many votes. There Ib ve been many
cases in recent years where congressmen have been re-elected despite the fact
that their districts supported the other party in statewide or national elec-
tions. In the State of Washington, home of the wide-open primary, the ultimate
in split tickets was achieved in 1<^52: presidential. Republican; senatorial.
Democratic; six district congressmen, six Republicans; one congressman-at-large,
D^BOcratic; governor. Republican; legislature, divided; and similar results in
minor state offices and county elections.
Again, this is not a new phenomenon. Seventy years ago Wilson concluded
that party responsibility in the House usually begins and ends with the formal
organization and election of officers. The chief reason:
that most of them are framed with a veiw to securing their easy passage by
giving them as neutral and inoffensive character as possible.**





because the parent of all the rest, is that there are in
Congress no authoritative leaders who are the recognized spokesmen
of their parties. Power is nowhere concentrated; it is rather de-
liberately and of set policy scattered amongst many small chiefs.
It is divided up, as it were, into forty-seven seigniories, in each
of which a Standing Coimaittee is the court -baron and its chairman
lord-proprietor. ^^
One reason for this lack of party responsibility is the nature of the
major parties themselves. "Absance of firmly defined and broad social purposes
pursued over many decades"^"^ is the distinguishing mark of both parties. "They
are very like each other in their organizational basis, and their appeal to all
AA
classes and occupations and areas.
In 1885, Wilson wrote:
It is probably also this lack of leadership which gives to our
national parties their curious, conglomerate character. It would
seem to be scarcely an exaggeration to say that they are homogeneous
only in name. Neither of the two principal parties is of one mind
with itself. Each tolerates all sorts of difference of creed and
variety of aim within its own ranks. Each pretends to the same
purposes and permits among its partisans the same contradictions to
those purposes. They are grouped around no legislative leaders whose
capacity has been tested and to whose opinions they loyally adhere.
They are like armies without officers, engaged upon a campaign which
has no great cause at its back.
. . .
Their names and traditions, not
their hopes and policy, keep them together. 45
Sixty-five years later, Millspaugh reached the same conclusions:
Each of the major parties is a loose alliance of faction. As
an organization, it is disunited and without appropriate means of
discipline. These phenomena are accompanied by and related to an
intellectual undermining and moral weakening of the party. It lacks
a logically developed, a sufficiently able, and a continuously effec-
tive leadership, and it is unable to maintain its solidarity. Conse-
quently, we do not have clear party responsibility and definite party
government.'^"
42 40
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Thus we have little political control over Congress by means of the
organized parties. Each promises what it hopes to be enough to win the forth-
coming election and blames the other for every conceivable calamity. In truth
most national elections are decided on the basis of personality and how mad at
the moment the voters are at the party in power. Even this is a misnomer, since
neither party is really in power. What little control the party held over its
candidates largely disappeared with the advent of the direct primary. Even
then, local issues often determined the elections. Each party, in and out of
Congress, contains shades of opinion ranging from pre-McKinley to post-Henry
Wallace. For either party to present a program palatable to both extreme
groups is impossible and temporary inter-party alliances of men of similar
thinking is the usual scheme of things. Northern and Southern Democrats (or
Eastern and Midwestern Republicans) usually fight more with each other than
with the opposite party.
While this produces a certain amount of inefficiency and irresponsibility
in government, it is not necessarily something to abhor. Fortunately, our poli-
tical traditions do not support major party organization on class or economic
grounds. A glance at the instability of a multi-party system, such as in
France, makes our two-party system far more attractive. For the major parties
to limit themselves to members of like thinking would create numerous addi-
tional parties to accomodate those who would be otherwise left out. The result
would probably be more political instability than at present. Ultimately, we
may come to non-partisan congressional elections similar to those now in effect
for two state legislatures and many city councils. California has almost
achieved this with a cross-filing primary system which permits a candidate to






The natural desire of Congressmen for re-election requires attention to
the wants of local groups in a constituency. This is reflected in the intro-
duction of many bills in the House and the insertion of many speeches in the
Congressional Record which may or may not reflect the actual views of the mem-
ber. The member is thus provided with political ammunition and he relies on
the good judgment of the committee to fail to report doubtful legislation. In
a similar manner members desiring to serve the broad public interest must avoid
offense to minority groups. The power of the Rules Conmiittee to prevent meas-
ures from reaching the floor—where a vote would force the member either to
cotmnit political suicide or to vote for a measure which he was convinced was
against the public welfare—has helped the members to avoid the strong organizec
pressure of certain groups (veterans, labor, Negro, segretation, big business,
etc.). These and other procedural methods are necessary for the survival poli-
tically of the members
—
particularly those who are the least selfish and most
concerned with the national welfare. *Tar too many in the electorate feel so
intensely on some one issue that the member's total record is ignored.**^ To
take a stand on every issue is soon to create such a number of disgruntled
voters as to make re-election of the member most unlikely. Blocking of action
by means of other than a direct vote thus preserves the services of many of the
better members.
Millspaugh, who takes a dim view of Congress at best, says:
Under ordinary circumstances, the reason for divergent and contra-
dictory opinions is to be found in the geographical distribution of
economic interests. In some states and particularly in some congres-







other electoral subdivisions show a predominance of industrial wage
earners. The agricultural interest, the industrial interest, or the
labor interest includes a large number of subinterests. These are,
generally speaking, the real 'special interests' of which we hear so
much. In a particular congressional district, most of the voters nay
have the same special interest or a special interest may hold the bal-
ance of power. In such cases, the representative of the district in
Congress will necessarily be controlled or at least strongly influ-
enced by that interest.
Consequently, members of Congress tend to become, and in practice
they usually are, representatives of special interests and generally
respond to the demands of those interests, even when such demands
have no relation whatever to any national public opinion. On the
other hand, when a special interest is absent from a district, its
representative is inclined to feel unconcerned, except from the stand-
point of party regularity or logrolling. ^^
'*rhis economic and sectional pattern reflects itself within Congress in
a number of ways. . . . most obvious are the coveted memberships on committees
which consider the measures most decisive for the region
. . .
which the member
represents.** Membership of many committees . is thus largely restricted to
members with a local axe to grind—agriculture is dominated by the farm states;
l&bor and education by the districts dominated by organized labor or conserva-
tive capital, each to offset the other; interior and insuler affairs from states
west of the one hundreth meridian; Merchant Marine and fisheries from maritime
and lake-front districts (thus two of seven members from the State of Washing-
ton in the 84th Congress served on this committee); and, judiciary by friends
and enemies of segregation. In this specialized Congress, recommendations of
the committees are a very potent influence on the success or failure of the
proposed legislation. Hearings are easily arranged so that witnesses are called
who share the views of members. By logrolling methods additional support may
be obtained for specialized legislation. Thus, many laws are enacted by and
48
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for the groups which they will most directly effect with little regard for the
welfare of the country as a whole. Such economic monstrosities as the protec-
tive tariffs and other subsidies, capital gains taxes, and the punitiva pro-
gressive income and estate taxes are the result of selfish and unenlightened
class legislation. High excise taxes on tobacco products, alcoholic beverages
and playing cards represent the influence of bigoted religious groups more than
the merits of certainty and ease of collection which make these levies adminis-
tratively attractive. Reform in this area is beyond the control of Congress.
lit/
The selfishness, ignorance and emotional stability of the American voter can
usually be relied upon to elect representatives who will support interests of
the local voter to the possible detriment of the national interest. Until such
tine as the educational system of this nation is capable of improving the intel-
lectual capacity of the voters, there need be little hope for much improvement
in Congress.
Under these circumstances, it is necessary that we view with under-
standing the motivation and resulting actions of the members of Congress so
that desirable measures may be made as politically attractive as possible and
undesirable ones exposed in a manner which will best create an unfavorable
public reacion. An understanding of the Congress is necessary—not because we
can change it, but because we must live with it. The personal view of the
writer is that Congress usually does a great deal better than we have any right
to expect and that most of the members are much more capable than is gener-
ally appreciated or, perhaps, than they (the members) want their constituents
to realize.








That (1) it enables the different sectional and regional interests
of a vast country to be voiced and considered in the legislative pro-
cess; (2) local interests can find expression in the House and sec-
tional interests in the Senate, whereas the President serves the
national interest; (3) it keeps the government closer to the people
since congressmen can and do inform their constituents about national
problems; and (4) no other plan of representation would be as demo-
cratic or as practicable,^^
Congress is envisioned as the protector of state's rights and the buffer
between the citizen and the great federal bureaucracy. Critics assert that
Congressmen can disregard the national interest without fear as long as they
please their own constituents. Greater interdependence of the economy as ex-
pressed in the growth of great cities and national markets reduces the impor-
tance of localism. Despite this, few statesmen emerge who can put aside local
influence and fewer are re-elected. One solution which has been offered is to
broaden the interest of congressmen by increasing the term of office to four
years with, perhaps, half the membership elected each two years. This would be
less democratic in that the members would not be as immediately responsive to
the will of the electorate.
Other recommendations which have been made include elimination of the
usage that members must be residents of the districts from which elected—how
this is to be accomplished is not stated. Also increase of party government,
national choice in some way of committee chairmen, and provision for addi-
tional members to be elected from the entire country have been considered. All
of these seem difficult of implementation. The last proposal has some merit
and could be tied to other suggestions that ex-presidents be made life members
of the Senate. These will be considered in the next chapter. Another proposal,
that members be made ineligible for re-election, seems too visionary for serious
consideration*
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SIZE OF THE HOUSE
Discussions as to the optimum size of the House of Representatives turn
to two conflicting arguments: (1) the House is already too large for effective
action as a deliberative assembly; and, (2) the House is too small to be repre-
sentative of the population and to accomplish its duties. It is generally
agreed that the House is always under the press of time and that the demands,
both legislative and from individual constituents, upon the members are too
great. "The great majority of the senators and representatives are consci-
entious and busy men. There are not enough hours in the day for them.'
**The ratio of Representatives to population has fallen from one to 33,000 in
1790 to one for every 344,586 in 1950. At the 1790 ratio, the House today
2
would have 4,542 members.'
As far back as 1832, there was a feeling among many that the House mem-
bership had increased too rapidly. In debate, Webster predicted that "by the
natural operation of events the old states must part with a considerable por-
tion of their representation." Later there was a period of understanding be-
tween the slower growing older states, desirous of retaining at least their
existing seats, and the faster growing younger states, ambitious for additional










"The champions of reform in 1<)02 demonstrated that a smaller number would result
in economy* in freedom from confusion, in decreased power of conmittees, larger
3
opportunity for the individual, and less rigid rules.**
Many of the sources cited seem to have trouble arriving at a conclusion
other than a vague notion that there were too many members. This is supported
by the indefinite ''some" and '*they." For example, Galloway writes:
A body with several hundred members, so the argument runs, cannot
function as a real deliberative assembly. Scuae believe that the House
is already too big and that it should be reduced to around 300 members.
Ogg and Ray agree: ". . . the membership ... is too large. . . . It is
generally agreed that something like 300 would be a figure more compatible with
5
efficient conduct of legislative business." Johnson tells us that: **.
. .
the present membership ... is generally considered too high for the most
satisfactory working of a legislative body.
Millspaugh, more emphatic, states: "The House of Representatives, par-
ticularly, is not a working group but an unwieldy 'multitude. * It has long
since ceased as a body to be deliberative. Debates on the floor are rarely of
any consequence.*' Walker takes a more neutral position, but brings out the
fact that the smaller the size of the House, the greater the proportionate
influence of the smaller states. He writes:
There has been considerable criticism of the size of the national
House of Representatives. It is too large for informality in proce-
dure, particularly in debate. Close time limits must be set upon
speeches. The number of persons who may speak on a question must be
restricted. Because of its large size and the heterogenity of its
membership, control tends to gravitate into the hands of small cliques
of majority party leaders. The size of the House rests entirely upon
Alexander, op. cit., p. 7. '^Galloway, op. cit .. p. 262.
5 AOgg and Ray, op. cit .. p. 264. ^Johnson, op. cit
.. p. 352.
7
Millspaugh, op. cit .. p. 212.
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the determination of Congress, The smaller the House, the larger
the number of people which each member will be called upon to repre-
sent, and the fewer the members who will be allotted to each state.
Under the 1940 census each member represents approximately 300,000
persons on the average. If the House were reduced to one-half its
present size, say to 220 members, each would have to represent
approximately 660,000 on the average. Ten states, which had, in
1940, less than 600,000 persons each would still, under the Consti-
tution, receive one representative, thus increasing the disproportion
which exists even now because of this provision.
While there is no general agreement, it is generally conceded
the House of Representatives should not be reduced in size."
There is one flaw in the above arguments. In 1884, before the admission
of ten small (population-wise) western states, there were 315 members in the
House of Representatives and exactly the same conditions prevailed which are
now cited to demonstrate that 435 members are too many. Passages already
quoted from Woodrow Wilson's excellent little book. Congressional Government ,
show that domination by committees, limitations on debate, and control by
small majority cliques were the order of the day then no less than now.
Arguments In favor of a larger House include the fact that:
Congressmen now have more people to represent, that individual
and group demands upon them for special services and legislative
action have immensely multiplied, that they have become less ac-
cessible to the people and less responsive to their interests, and
that they can no longer maintain close personal relationships with
their constituents,*^
Anderson and Weidner feel that "there is a tendency for party discipline
to increase as members increase. "^^ This is not borne out by comparison of
Wilson's writings with contemporary literature on the subject. In neither
instance has party discipline been a factor in the legislative process.
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still a relatively small body.'*^^ Again slightly misleading—most foreign
legislatures perform the executive function as well as the legislative through
the parliamentary system. Actually, the British House of Commons has 630 mem-
bers, to be increased slightly by the addition of Malta's delegation.
Finer presents the strongest argument on either side:
The bigger the number of representatives, the smaller need the
electoral districts be. This conduces to heightened representative-
ness. For good law, representativeness is of cardinal importance;
all men get the sense that they are being duly heard in the uses of
authority. On the other hand, too large an assembly may be so un-
wieldy as to defeat effective procedure. In my own opinion, the
claims of thorough representativeness have a very high order of va-
lidity. As for procedural clumsiness, since so large a part of
legislative work is already done in committees, there is very little
harm in increasing the size of the legislature. Indeed, I strongly
favor the increase in size of the lower house to eight hundred in
all modernized democratic states. This increase is to allow for
more representativeness, and for the full manning of the many com-
mittees which a modern assembly must have to prepare the laws and,
above all, to supervise the administration. I fully appreciate the
need for a small, well-knit, coherent assembly, to attain coherence
above all. But the other claims are powerful; it is the business
of internal procedure to meet them, and to provide for coherence
also. In a planning age, the legislature must be bigger. If time
cannot be stretched beyond three hundred and sixty-five days in a
year, then the legislature's burdens must be borne by multiplying
its working members. ^^
The writer must conclude that the argument for a larger House is the
sounder for the following reasons: the present size is already unwieldy, as
it was in 1884 with 120 less members, so this disadvantage to increased member-
ship is relatively unimportant; there is need for increased representativeness
and smaller districts; smaller districts will permit better districting by the
states since it would be easier to create districts of single political units-
refusal to admit members -at-large from states apportioned more than one seat
would force redistricting action in some of the hesitant states; additional





members would permit larger coomilttees, more diversified talent, and opportunity
for increased specialization of members; and, increased membership would be
more democratic since the influence of the single member states would be less
in proportion to the whole and more nearly in proportion to actual population.
Tables 2 and 3 hereafter are to demonstrate the results of a larger House and
how **good*' districting could thereby be accomplished in an average state. The
State of Washington was selected for the latter purpose both because the writer
is more familiar with the political geography of Washington than of other
states and because it is nearly the median state (23rd) in population.
There has been considerable criticism of Congress because members often
vote upon legislation of which they know little of the actual content and rely
for decision upon committee recommendations and political alignments. This is
a natural result of the modern age of complex problems, specialization, and
expert knowledge. Even if it were possible to interest them in running for
Congress, where would it be possible to obtain representatives well versed in
more than a limited number of subjects? Most of the incumbents are lawyers,
who as a profession rely upon expert witnesses, with business, agriculture, and
education furnishing most of the rest of the membership.
Unfortunately the numbers of Jeffersons and Franklins that this country
can produce are limited. How many members of a university faculty are well
informed in the details of disciplines other than their specialty? How many
professional men are widely read outside of their profession? Do many business
men or farmers, largely technically educated, have much knowledge of affairs
outside their industry? A fair answer to all of these questions would probably
be "^very few. ** Yet from these and similar sources are congressmen nominated.











APPORTIONMEKT OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE
RATE OF ONE PER 250,000 POPULATION
ESTIMATED, BASED ON 1950 CENSUS
AND MAJOR FRACTIONS
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PROPOSED REDISTRICING OF THE STATE OF






1 King: 1/2 City of Seattle 234
2 King: 1/2 City of Seattle 234
3 King: less City of Seattle 265
4 Pierce : including City of Tacoma 276








6 Olympic Peninsula and South Puget Sound
Clallam 26 Jefferson
Kitsap 76 Mason




South Pacific Coast and lower Columbia River
Clark 85 Cowlitz 53
Skamania 5 Pacific 17
Lewis 44 Wahkaikum 4
East Central—East of Cascade Mts. West of Columbia
River
208
Klickitat 12 Benton 51
Yakima 136 Kittitas 22
Chelan 39
;tern Washingt on (less Spokane County)
Franklin 14 Douglas 11
Walla Walla 40 Okanogan 29
Grant 24 Ferry 4
Adams 7 Stevens 19
Whitman 32 Pend Oreille 7
Asotin 11 Lincoln 11
Columbia 5 Garfield 3
260
Spokane County: including City of Spokane
217
222






finance, education, economics, transportation, public utilities, the strategy
and logistics of war, foreign affairs, labor relations, agriculture, and public
administration—to cite but a partial list of fields in which controversial
legislation is frequently considered—sheer lack of time would prevent careful
consideration by the individual member of all or even the most important
measures before the House. Actually, the matter of relative importance is far
from cut and dried. The writer, therefore, is of the opinion that it is unreal-
istic to expect these all-purpose legislators to emerge out of thin air as a
result of certain ''reforms." The rest of the country relies upon expert advice
as needed so why should not the Congress? That seniority of service with com-
mittee specialization produces a member who is himself a specialist in a certaii^
field and is, therefore, trusted and respected by his colleagues as regards
his opinions or recommendations in that particular field does not seem unreason-j-
able.
The question of nation representation is frequently discussed. To serve
the full purpose, such nationally elected or appointed figures would have to
have all of the existing rights and privileges of other members—including
vote, conmiittee appointments, emoluments, debate, etc. Election of six
toational senators, two each year for six year terms, would provide not only
the services of distinguished national leaders, but also an automatic presi-
dential nomination preference. Sitting members would have proved their vote-
pulling strength in national elections. House members should probably repre-
sent broad areas. Based on 1940 and 1950 census figures, fifteen national
representatives could be divided equitably as follows: northeast 4, north
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A second group of talent which would improve the Congress is the very
limited number of ex-presidents and ex-vice presidents that are available at
any one tine. Automatic appointment of the former to the Senate and the latter
to the House for life, again with the same rights and privileges as other mem-
bers, would provide the greatest experience available where it would help the
most.
Figures 4 and 5 show how few of these leaders would be available at any
one session even assuming that health and age permitted them to participate.
TABLE 4
VICE PRESIDEl^S WHO, SINCE 1900,
SURVIVED THEIR TERMS IN OFFICE
Levi P. Morton of New York (1900-1920) 20 years
Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois (1900-1914) 14 years
Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana (1909-1918) 9 years
Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana (1921-1925) 4 years
Charles G. Dawes of Illinois (1929-1951) 22 years
Charles Curtis of Kansas (1933-1936) 3 years
John N. Garner of Texas (1941- ) 15 years
Henry A. Wallace of Iowa (1945- ) 11 years
Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky (1953- ) 3 years
101





PRESIDENTS WHO, SINCE 1900, SURVIVED
THEIR TERMS IN OFFICE
Grover Cleveland of New Jersey (1900-1908) 8 years
Benjamin Harrison of Ohio (1900-1901) 1 year
Theodore Roosevelt of Narw York (1909-1919) 10 years
William Howard Taft of Ohio (1913-1930) 17 years
Woodrow Wilson of Virginia (1921-1924) 3 years
Calvin Coolidge of Vermont (1929-1933) 4 years
Herbert Hoover of Iowa (1933- ) 23 years
Harry S, Truman of Missouri (1953- ) _Z years
69 years
Average number of survivors per year (69/56): 1,23
There is one other source of representation which must be considered
—
the District of Columbia and the territories. Since none is a state, there is
no valid argument for representation in the Senate; but since the inhabitants
of each pay federal taxes, they should be able to elect representatives with
the rights and privileges of any other member in lieu of the delegates or no
representation which now exist. By declaration of the Continental Congress in
1776, one of the causes which impelled separation fcom England was 'Tor
13imposing Taxes on us without Our consent.' Our position in doing the saae
thing, is scarcely admirable. Added representation from these sources would
be approximately: Alaska 1, Hawaii 2, and the District of Columbia 2, under
the 1950 apportionment. Based on the recommended 599 member House, this would
be: Alaska 1, Hawaii 2, and the District of Columbia 3. Puerto Rico, being a
coomionwealth under separate tax laws, is net considered in this connection and
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achieve territorial status. ^^
All of the above would require amendment to the Constitution, but the
effort is considered well worthwhile. National representation would offset the
evils of localism to some extent and certainly there can be little argument as
to the "right" of our district and territorial taxpayers to representation in
the national House. If these and the increased House recommendation were all
implemented, the total size of the House would be not more than 623.
14
The question of whether these and the so-called national representa-
tives should be included or separate in the organization of the Electoral College
has not been considered. That should be the subject of a separate study in con-
nection with some of the electoral "reforms" now being proposed by various mtem-












Conclusions of the writer have been introduced, with appropriate convnent
and argument^ throughout this text. In brief summary they are: that much
improvement in the House of Representatives will depend in the long run on a
better educated electorate; that the present apportionment process is sound and
should be continued; that there is need for a larger House, perhaps some 600 to
630 now (or by 1960) and a gradual increase as the national population increase^;
that Congress should take positive action to improve districting standards;
that the full impact of seniority should be curtaifed by limited tenure in
committee chairmanships; that it should be recognized that we are and will con-
tinue to be in an age of specialization; that there should be some form of
national representation to neutralize the influence of sectionalism and local-
ism; and that the territories and the District of Columbia should be repre-
sented in the lower assembly of the national legislature.
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equal to or greater than the percentage of urban residents to the total popu-
20
lation of the state." Inequities in the apportionment of state legislatures
result from several causes: (1) failure to reapportion when due, e.g., Connec-
ticut since 1818, which in turn is caused largely to prevent shifting of power,
whether economic, political, or geographical; (2) constitutional limitations,
e.g., California which limits senators to not more than one per county so that
Los Angeles county, containing just less than forty percent of the population
of the state, has but one of forty state senators; and, (3) influence of poli-
tics, e.g., the gerrymander, to prevent shifts of political control based on
21
usually heavy Democratic urban and Republican rural majorities.
Not mentioned in any of the sources studied in connection with this
paper, but worthy, perhaps, of consideration, is the factor of population.
The Bureau of the Census classified the 1950 population census of the United
States to be 64 percent urban (96 million against 54 million rural), but this
classification reports inhabitants of villages of 2500 and up as urban. This
is most misleading politically since most of these small town voters are
either former farmers or depend upon agriculture for a substantial part of
their business—thus becoming essentially rural in economic and political out-
look.
The presence of large minority groups is evident. There were some
fifteen million negroes, ten million foreign born whites, and 5,200,000 Jews
(almost one-half of the world's Jewish population) counted in the 1950 census.
That the bulk of these minority groups, excepting Southern negroes and certain
Northern European whites, is concentrated in the large cities may be a factor
20
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in the reluctance of rural dominated legislatures to allow the cities their
proportionate share in representation, either state or national. Among the
ore striking examples are: one-third of the foreign born whites are concen-
trated in eight cities; forty-four percent of the Jewish population lives
within the City of New York; and there are such large immigrant blocs in other
cities as twenty-eight thousand Irish in Boston, ninety-four thousand Poles in
Chicago, sixteen thousand Hungarians in Cleveland, fifty-seven thousand Canadi-
ans in Detroit, forty thousand Mexicans in Los Angeles, fifty-four thousand
22
Russians in Philadelphia, and twenty thousand Italians in San Francisco.
When it is considered that there are many more native whites of foreign born
or mixed parentage and that there is a tendency for these minority groups to
concentrate in certain sections of the city where language, religious, cultural
and other ties with the "old country** are maintained, brave indeed is the legis-
lator or congressman who, with large minority groups in his district, can take
an objective view toward many problems of civil rights, foreign aid, military
assistance, and similar controversial issues.
Another cause is the usual difference of political philosophy, regard-
less of political party, between the so-called conservative county and liberal
city members. For example, Baily notes that, in 1945, of twenty-one congress-
men on the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, fourteen were
classed as "conservatives." Eight of these"conservatives" came from districts
containing no city larger than 30,000 population; five of seven "liberals"
represented tremendous urban concentrations.
p
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Regardless of cause, there seems to be no valid argument against equal-
ity of apportionment. In a few states use of the initiative has forced reap-
portionment; others have no such constitutional provisions. As Gosnell and
Holland have well said:
For state legislatures to refuse reapportionment of their mem-
berships in the face of constitutional mandates is to deny to the
people one of the very fundamentals of representative government. '^^
Thus the rural dominated legislatures have favored rural areas in the
creation of congressional districts. To quote Galloway:
,
During the decade 1940-1<)50, for example, rural districts were
overrepresented in Congress by a margin of 12 members, and urban
districts were underrepresented by 14, or 17 if the District of
Columbia is considered to be part of the United States. Moreover,
in mixed rural-urban districts representation is often distorted
by the submergence of urban minorities. This distortion is magni-
fied by the disparities in the population of congressional districts,
which in states like Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri have been so gross
as to give rise to *rotten borough* representation in Washington.
The distortion is further increased by the operation of the senior-
ity custom in the choice of coomittee chairmanships, the majority
of which are held by members from rural areas. ^^
In amplification of the greater liklihood of members from rural dis-
tricts achieving greater seniority, a recent report stated: "Two-thirds (61)
of the 93 House districts won in 1954 by less than 55 percent of the votes
were in mid-urban or big city areas. "^" In this report, mid-urban areas are
defined as containing cities over 50,000 in population.
Speaking in opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment to change
the method of counting votes in presidential elections. Senator Paul Douglas
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of Illinois said that the proposal would cost large cities and states what
lifflited influence they now have in national politics. Douglas said:
I would not oppose it if the large cities were not underrepre-
sented in state legislatures and the national House of Representa-
tives, but the fact is that most cities are grossly under-repre-
sented in the legislatures. The legislatures, in turn, gerrymander
the congressional districts so that the cities are under-represented
by perhaps 20 seats in the House of Representatives. 2'
The Gerrymander
A gerrymander is best described as an unnatural and arbitrary redis-
tricting of a state or county or, in other words, the unfair or abnormal alter-
28ing of a political map. One of the greatest discrepancies noted by Galloway
was in Ohio where the Fifth District had 166,932 inhabitants and the Twenty-
29
second District had 908,403. This was corrected in the recent redistricting
of the state.
The origin of the gerrymander was as follows:
In 1812 Governor Elbridge Gerry and the Republican legislature
of Massachusetts carved the state into new voting districts. In
Essex County they strung 12 towns together in such a way that the
heavy Republican vote in one of them (Marblehead) would overbalance
the Federalists in the other 11. On the map this district looked
like a squatting salamander. Engraver Elkanah Tisdale added claws,
wings, and fangs to the map and published it in the Boston Weekly
Messenger as "THE GERRY-MANDER.*" This famous cartoon introduced
a permanent word into American politics and helped defeat Governor
Gerry for re-election. (He was elected Vice President on Madison's
ticket later the same year.) But the gerrymander achieved its pur-
pose. In 1812 only 11 Federalist state senators were elected in
Massachusetts to 29 Republican, although the Federalists got 51,766
popular votes and Republicans, 50,164. This looked like cheating
27
Ibid., March 18, 1956, p. A 10.
28
,
cf. Anderson and Weidner, op. cit .. p. 511. Figure 30—Gerrymandering
the State of X—is an excellent graphic presentation of how a state can be di-
vided east-west or north-south to achieve two opposite political results.
29




to most voters and caused a violent reaction against the Republicans
in Massachusetts. 30
A more modern example of the gerrymander was found in the Fourteenth Ohio
District. ^^
The gerrymander is accepted by some as a legitimate political weapon.
Certainly it still exists in practice. Since, in many instances, a slight
shift in boundaries will often produce a large shift in political control, the
temptation is understandable. Neither party is without blame and the cry of
"unfair" or "gerrymander** is the usual reaction of the minority party—whether
sustainable or not. The most recent case of note was the attempt to redraw
the boundaries of the Fifth Wisconsin to unseat a Democratic congressman. The
attempt was defeated by the governor, a Republican, who vetoed the bill passed
by the Republican legislative majorities. There is a political danger in
being too crude as the more enlightened voters often support the injured party
in the next election as a protest against obvious unfairness.
Districts of the 64th Congress
Conditions as they exist in the 84th Congress are set forth hereafter.
Information was abstracted from the U. S. Congressional Directory . 84th Con-
gress, 1st Session. Only examples of unfair or undesirable districting are
cited. Generally, in a given state, only the greatest population discrepancies
are noted; there may be others of lesser magnitude. Comment included should
not be attributed to the above reference.
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Alabama ^ —Population <)th District (including Birmingham), 558,928; 6th
District (8 counties), 250,726; the two districts are in part contiguous with
a north-south boundary.
Arkansas .—Population 1st District (10 counties), 407,480; 2nd District
(13 counties), 224,278; the two districts are contiguous.
California .—•The Los Angeles County Gerrymander"—Los Angeles County is
unique in that it is not only the second largest county in the nation in terms
of population (about 400,000 less than Cook County, Illinois), but it contains
three major cities (Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Pasadena) and a host of smallei
urban centers. In addition, it is the leading county in the United States in
32
value of all farm products sold ($156,%2,336.00). Since it contains about










Average size of districts:
Republican (8) 295,505
Democratic (4) 446,912
County Average (12) 345.974
Districts are classed as Republican or Democratic based on party designation
of the incumbent congressman, a reasonably valid conclusion since 11 of 12 in-
cumbents were re-elected from the 83rd Congress and the 12th (James Roosevelt,


















is difficult to believe it a coincidence that the Republican controlled state
government created four Democratic districts all larger than eight Republican
districts. An interesting subject for a more specialized dissertation would
be the political nap of Los Angeles County with the consideration of political,
economic, racial, income, and agricultural groupings as compared with congres-
sional and legislative district bounds.
Colorado . —Population 1st District (including Denver), 415,783; 4th
District (Western Colorado), 173,298. Here there is a good geographical argu-
ment for the difference—the 4th District is all of Western Colorado, separated
from the rest of the state by the Rocky Mountains.
Connecticut .—Population 1st District (including Hartford), 539,661;
5th District (contiguous to 1st District), 274,300; one member elected "at
large**—Connecticut is badly in need of redistricting.
Florida . —Population 4th District (including Miami) 525,041; 8th Dis-
trict (15 counties), 210,428. Having just completed redistricting to accomo-
date two new s^ats awarded after the 1950 census, upon which these population
figures are based, there seems to be little Justification for this wide
variance.
Georgia . —Population 5th District (3 counties, including Atlanta),
618,413; 9th District (IB northeastern counties), 246,227. These two district!
are contiguous so it would not take much imagination to transfer one or two of
the small counties from the 5th to the 9th District to help equalize the rela-
tive numbers.
Indiana
. —Population Uth District (including Indianapolis), 551,777;
9th District (14 counties in southern Indiana), 258,441.
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Kansas,—3rd District (9 counties), 227,270; 4th District (15 counties),
448,435. These two districts are contiguous so transfer of counties from the
3rd to the 4th District should not be too difficult.
Kentucky . --Population 1st District (17 western counties), 304,978; 3rd
District (including Louisville), 484,615.
Louisiana . —Population 6th District, 417,898; 8th District, incumbent
G. S, Long, son of the late Huey P. Long, 249,776.
Maryland .—Population 1st District (eastern shore), 210,623; 5th Dis-
trict (including part of Baltimore), 426,371.
Michigan . —Population 12th District (north peninsula), 176,251; 16th
District (including part of Detroit), 525,534. The second smallest district,
the 11th, is also in the north penensula.
Minnesota . —Population 3rd District (including part of Minneapolis),
433,942; 9th District (15 northwest counties), 273,125.
Mississippi . —Population 2nd District, 281,207; 4th District. 426,396.
Missouri.—Population 1st District (St. Louis), 427,856; 8th District,
(19 counties in the southeast)^ 276,499. Of eleven districts in Missouri, the
three largest are all in St. Louis.
New Jersey .—Population 1st District (including Camden), 441,978; 2nd
District (south Atlantic), 258,127. New Jersey is unique in that metropolitan
Hudson County (Jersey City, Hoboken, Bayonne) is over-represented, i.e., 13th
District, 269,643; 14th District, 275,053.
New Mexico .—Both congressmen are elected •*at large"—one notes that
both incumbents are from Santa Fe.
North Carolina.—Population 1st District (14 tidewater counties),
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North Dakota . —Both congressmen are elected "at large."
Ohio .—Population 3rd District (2 counties including Dayton), 545,644;
15th District (7 southeastern counties), 226,341.
Oklahoma . —Population 1st District, 439,518; 3rd District, 266,995.
Oregon . —Population 2nd District, 247,383; 3rd District (including
Portland), 471,537, The 2nd District comprises all of eastern Oregon, isolated
by the Cascade Mountains, with a very different climatic and economic situation
and is twice as big in area as the other three Districts combined.
Pennsylvania . --Population 14th District (including Reading), 255,740;
26th District (southwest), 444,921.
South Carolina.—Population 2nd District, 415,893; 5th District,
266,559. Both contain numerous counties and are contiguous.
South Dakota . —Population 1st District (44 eastern counties), 493,641;
2nd District (24 western counties), 159,009. Time has marched on and left
South Dakota—it is now possible to cross the Missouri River.
Tennessee .—Population 8th District (9 counties north of Memphis),
247.943; 9th District (including Memphis), 482,393.
Texas.—Population 5th District (including Dallas), 614,799; 8th Dis-
trict (including Houston), 806,701; 20th District (including San Antonio),
500,460; 17th District, 226,739. Texas elects one congressman-at-large des-
pite the fact that Harris County alone (8th District) is more than entitled to
two congressional districts.. Texas is an outstanding example of the rural
gerrymander and is badly in need of redistricting.
Washington
. —Population 1st District (Seattle and Kitsap County), 527,766
3rd District (southwest and contiguous to Kitsap County), 321,162. King County










is elected **at large** as the politically divided legislature has been unable
to agree on a revision of districts.
West Virginia . —Population 1st District, 279,954; 6th District. 446,466,
Wisconsin . —Population 4th District (Milwaukee). 438,041; 10th District
(14 northwestern counties), 249,654.
There is no need to belabor the above except to conclude that the need
for redistricting on a more equitable basis in raost states is obvious. The
findings support previous conclusions that, in general, the urban districts are
large in coffiparison with rural districts and that the science of gerrymandering
is not dead. Many writers have indicated a belief that legislatures should not
be restricted to county or similar political boundaries when setting up dis>
tricts. This is valid to an extent, but if the legislatures could cut up
counties at will, the results might well be worse. Virginia, for example, coulc
eliminate the political influence of the ''Arlington Yankees" by dividing the
County among several other districts extending, if necessary, to the North
Carolina border.
Congress should enact legislation setting up standards for districting
and rely upon the citizens of the several states to enforce these requirements.
An exception should be the matter of congressmen-at -large from states with more
than one district. Congress has ample constitutional authority to forbid the
seating of such members. This would force the states to eliminate this anachro-
nism lest they lose proportionate influence in the national legislature.
Proposed standards include: (1) single member districts; (2) following
existing political boundaries to the most practicable extent; (3) c<MBipact and
contiguous territories within the districts; (4) where the population of a
political entity is in excess of standards for a single district, division into
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additional complete districts so that not nore than one district would be com-
bined with other political units. In other words, if a city is divided, all
but one district fr<»n that city must be completely within the city, a nd, (5)
population of the districts to be as equal as possible, but in no case will the
population of the largest district exceed that of the smallest district by more
than forty percent of the population of the smallest district.
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CHAPTER VI
CENTERS OF POWER *
House Leadership
Centers of power are necessary in any body if much is to be accomplished.
Too arbitrary exercise of that power, as in the case of Speaker Cannon, will
lead to revolt; but new centers necessarily arise. Today power is diffused
through the Speaker, majority leader, coonnittee chairmen (who can usually block
and often promote legislation), and the Rules Coimnittee. Exercise of this powex
is through the political party in the majority at the particular session. Party
influence over members is limited by the seniority tradition, but reward for
faithful service is available through appointment to a more desirable com-
mittee. Party influence is further restrained by the impact of sectional and
local considerations.
Political influence is wielded through the caucus which is a meeting of
all reasonably regular party men to select officers, approve coranittee assign-
ments, and, if the majority party, to provide for the organization of the House.
Members are expected to follow the dictates of the caucus in matters of party
policy, organization, and election of House officers and coimDittee members.
Actually about ninety percent of the measures in Congress are nonpartisan in
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According to Johnson, the majority caucus is in ultimate control of the Bouse
through its elected leaders. Johnson says further:
At times these leaders are allowed piactically a free hand; at
other times the caucus prefers to retain a share of the control of
the party's legislative program and tactics. Whether the caucus con-
trols the House directly or a few party leaders (the President and
others) control both the caucus and the House, depends upon the poli-
tical leaders and upon the spirit of the caucus.^
The elected leader of the House is the Speaker. After him is the floor
leader. "The head of Ways and Means is the titular leader, and before the
division of that committee the multitude of his duties made him the actual
leader. But in 1865 the burden of legislation shifted to the chairman of Ap-
propriations, who often becomes the real leader."
Speaking of the floor leader, Alexander, in 1916, said:
It is said that tact rather than genius is the quality most
needed for the work of a floor leader. ... It certainly does not
follow that a floor leader is the most effective debater, or the
profoundest thinker, or the accepted leader of his party, although
he may be and sometimes is all of these. It should imply, however,
that in the art of clear, forceful statement, of readily spotting
weak points in an opponent's argument, and in dominating power to
safeguard the interests of the party temporarily responsible for
the legislative record of the House, he is the best equipped for
this trade. It is neither necessary nor advisable for him to lead
or even to take part in every debate. The wisdom of silence is a
great asset. Besides, chairmen and members of other committees are
usually quite capable and sufficiently enthusiastic to protect their
own measures. But the floor leader must aid the Speaker in straight-
ening out parliamentary tangles, in progressing business, and in
exhibiting an irresistible desire to club any captious interference
with the plans and purposes of the majority.
5
The Rules CoBraittee of the House covers the whole matter of procedure.
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